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No Means No . . . Sometimes 
DEVELOPMENTS IN POSTPENETRATION RAPE LAW 
AND THE NEED FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION 
INTRODUCTION 
“He wouldn’t listen and he didn’t stop,” explained the 
seventeen-year-old victim.1 She knew her aggressor, Osvaldo 
Sombo—also seventeen. At the time of “the incident,” they were 
in what the prosecutor called a “dating relationship.”2 
According to the prosecutor, 
[she] initially wanted to limit their contact on this occasion to just 
kissing. Through mutual consent, their behavior proceeds to heavy 
petting. The victim’s statements to the responding officer and the 
sexual assault nurse examiner indicate that at some point during 
this event [Osvaldo] put on a condom and penetrated her with his 
penis, it hurt and she told him to stop. [Osvaldo] did not acquiesce to 
her desire and proceeded with rough vaginal intercourse while she 
continued to tell him to stop.3 
Osvaldo was arrested and charged with second-degree rape and 
sexual battery, yet the prosecutor dropped the charges a month 
later.4 Although the victim bravely came forward and reported 
the rape, the prosecutor filed a dismissal, citing “insufficient 
evidence to warrant prosecution,”5 because: 
State v. Way . . . states that if initial penetration occurs with the 
victim’s consent, no rape has occurred though the victim later 
withdraws consent during the same act of intercourse. The victim’s 
initial statements to law enforcement and medical personnel do not 
indicate initial penetration was without her consent, rather, the 
statements imply that she withdrew consent because of the pain she 
was suffering and that the defendant paid no heed but continued to 
  
 1 Cara Kulwicki, North Carolina: Consent to Sex Cannot be Withdrawn, 
CURVATURE (Sept. 23, 2010), http://thecurvature.com/2010/09/23/north-carolina-consent-
to-sex-cannot-be-withdrawn. 
 2 Dismissal at 2, State v. Sombo, No. 10-CR-238650 (N.C. Super. Ct. Sept. 
21, 2010). 
 3 Id. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Id. 
1068 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78:3 
hurt her. Therefore, applying State v[.] Way to the facts of the case, a 
[r]ape has not been legally committed.6 
Because of Way’s continued validity in North Carolina, this 
seventeen-year-old girl and other victims have no legal recourse 
if their partner does not discontinue sex after being told, “No.” 
If the prosecutor’s version of the facts is true, this young 
woman is a victim of what is known as postpenetration rape,7 a 
term first introduced in 1991.8 In contrast with other varieties of 
rape, postpenetration rape begins with consensual intercourse.9 
But, at some point after penetration, one partner revokes 
consent and states her “wish[] to terminate the sexual 
intercourse.”10 Then, although consent is revoked, the aggressor 
forcibly continues the sexual intercourse.11  
Currently, only Illinois has criminalized postpenetration 
rape by statutory amendment.12 The courts in seven states have 
also criminalized postpenetration rape.13 In these jurisdictions, 
  
 6 Dismissal, supra note 2, at 2; see also State v. Way, 254 S.E.2d 760, 761-62 
(N.C. 1979). In spite of the prosecutor’s statement that “initial penetration occur[ed] 
with consent,” the victim had not only not recanted, but had stated in at least one 
interview that “she had never consented to have sex and, once it started, told Sombo 
repeatedly to stop.” Eric Frazier, Rape Charges Dropped Against Butler Player, 
CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (Sept. 22, 2010), http://www.qcitymetro.com/news/articles/ 
rape_charges_dropped_aganst_butler_player05502829.cfm. 
 7 Amy McLellan, Comment, Postpenetration Rape—Increasing the Penalty, 
31 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 779, 780 (1991). 
 8 Amanda O. Davis, Comment, Clarifying the Issue of Consent: The 
Evolution of Postpenetration Rape Law, 34 STETSON L. REV. 729, 731 n.7 (2005). 
 9 McLellan, supra note 7, at 780. 
 10 Id. Although men are also victims of rape and sexual assault, this note will 
primarily discuss the rape of women. Women report rape/sexual assault more 
frequently than men and one could infer that this indicates women are more frequently 
victims of rape/sexual assault. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, NATIONAL CRIME VICTIMIZATION STUDY: CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION, 2010, at 12 
(2011) [hereinafter CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION, 2010]. For an in-depth treatment of men 
as victims of rape, see generally Bennett Capers, Real Rape Too, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 
1259 (2011). 
 11 McLellan, supra note 7, at 780. 
 12 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-1.70(c) (LexisNexis 2012).  
 13 See, e.g., McGill v. State, 18 P.3d 77, 84 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001); In re John 
Z., 60 P.3d 183, 185 (Cal. 2003); State v. Siering, 644 A.2d 958, 961 (Conn. App. Ct. 
1994); State v. Bunyard, 133 P.3d 14, 27 (Kan. 2006); State v. Robinson, 496 A.2d 1067, 
1070 (Me. 1985); State v. Baby, 946 A.2d 463, 486 (Md. 2008); State v. Crims, 540 
N.W.2d 860, 865 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995). Several other courts appear to agree with those 
above, without explicitly holding that rape can occur postpenetration. See, e.g., 
Davenport v. Vaughn, No. Civ. A. 00-5316, 2005 WL 856912, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 14, 
2005), aff’d sub nom. Davenport v. Diguglielmo, 215 Fed. Appx. 175 (2007) (applying 
Pennsylvania law) (noting a “reject[ion] [of] the Petitioner’s assertion that only the 
initial act of penetration counts as penetration under the rape statute, so a withdrawal 
of consent after sexual intercourse has begun is not rape unless the man withdraws 
and then ‘penetrates’ again”); State v. Crain, 946 P.2d 1095, 1102 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997) 
(noting “that other jurisdictions have questioned the legal validity of the proposition 
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the elements of postpenetration rape are generally that: (1) 
both parties initially consent to penetration; (2) one party 
subsequently withdraws consent in a manner capable of being 
understood by a reasonable person;14 (3) the other party fails to 
discontinue the act; and (4) instead continues penetration by 
force15 or compulsion.16 Only North Carolina maintains that 
forcibly continuing intercourse after withdrawal of consent is 
not rape.17  
The remaining forty-one states either have never 
addressed the issue or have failed to enunciate a clear answer. 
This lack of attention may be because postpenetration rapes are 
rarely reported or prosecuted, or because juries are not properly 
instructed on the possibility of rape after initially “consensual” 
penetration. Whatever the reason, this note argues that the way to 
stop these rapes and spur reports, prosecutions, and convictions is 
through statutory amendments and clear jury instructions. 
This note charts the progress of postpenetration rape 
law and calls for legislative amendment, aiming to reform legal 
and social attitudes toward rape. Part I discusses the 
imperative of criminalizing postpenetration rape. Part II 
reviews the current state of statutory and case law on 
postpenetration rape. Part III calls for legislative action and 
statutory amendment. Part IV proposes model jury instructions 
for postpenetration rape cases. Part V criticizes the judicial 
creation of a “reasonable time” allowance in postpenetration 
rape cases. This note concludes with a look forward at the 
positive sociological impact of recognizing postpenetration rape 
  
that there can be no rape . . . if the victim’s consent is withdrawn after penetration has 
begun [but,] [n]oting the questionable legal validity of the withdrawal-of-consent 
theory in other jurisdictions and the evidence presented at trial, we do not find that 
Defendant’s trial counsel acted unreasonably in declining to present or rely upon this 
novel theory.” (citations omitted)); State v. Jones, 521 N.W.2d 662, 672 (S.D. 1994) 
(noting that “[t]his court has never held that initial consent forecloses a rape 
prosecution and, based on the facts of this case, we choose not to adopt [that] position” 
(citation omitted)). 
 14 See, e.g., People v. Denbo, 868 N.E.2d 347, 358 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007) (“Even 
though, subjectively, R.H. no longer consented, her withdrawal of consent was 
ineffective until she communicated it to defendant in some objective manner so that a 
reasonable person in defendant’s circumstances would have understood that R.H. no 
longer consented.” (citations omitted)); see also COMM. ON STANDARD JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS, CRIMINAL, CALIF. JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CRIMINAL § 1.23.1 (2011) (“The 
words or conduct must be sufficient to cause a reasonable person to be aware that 
consent has been withdrawn.”). 
 15 See, e.g., Baby, 946 A.2d at 486. 
 16 Robinson, 496 A.2d at 1070. 
 17 State v. Way, 254 S.E.2d 760, 761 (N.C. 1979). 
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as “real rape,” with hope for a subsequent decrease in the 
incidence of rape.18 
I. SETTING THE STAGE 
Whether a woman never consents to penetration, or 
initially consents but later revokes, should be irrelevant. 
“‘[L]ack of consent’ is . . . indeed, the essence . . . of the crime of 
rape.”19 To deny that continued sex after consent is withdrawn 
is rape affirms the definition of women as property, denies 
autonomy and bodily integrity to women, and deprives victims 
of legal recourse in the criminal justice system.20  
First, the refusal to recognize postpenetration rape as 
“real rape” stems from adherence to the understanding of women 
as property that underlies rape law generally. In both “ancient 
societies—and in the more recent American common law 
tradition—women were considered the legal property of their 
husbands and fathers”; thus, the rape of a woman was a crime 
against a man’s property.21 One scholar traces the understanding 
of women as property back to the Middle Assyrian Laws in place 
during the fifteenth to eleventh centuries BC,22 where “the rape of 
a virgin was presumed to be an illegal trespass upon the father’s 
property . . . because a virgin was considered a valuable asset, 
the value residing in men’s ability to gain absolute ownership of 
the totality of her sexual and reproductive functions.”23 
Similarly, she notes, Biblical law recognized rape as a property 
crime—that is, not as “an infringement upon a woman’s 
autonomy, but rather as an infringement of the father’s or 
husband’s property interest . . . [where] rape [of a virgin] was 
  
 18 “Real rape” is a term borrowed from Susan Estrich’s article, Rape, in which she 
investigates the ideas of “real rape” (i.e., violent rape by a stranger) and other rape, such as 
date rape and acquaintance rape. Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1088 (1986). 
 19 Joshua Dressler, Where We Have Been, and Where We Might Be Going: Some 
Cautionary Reflections on Rape Reform, 46 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 409, 424 (1998) (citing 
NANCY VENABLE RAINE, AFTER SILENCE: RAPE AND MY JOURNEY BACK 202, 210 (1998)). 
 20 See infra text accompanying notes 21-39. 
 21 Erin G. Palmer, Recent Development, Antiquated Notions of Womanhood 
and the Myth of the Unstoppable Male: Why Postpenetration Rape Should be a Crime in 
North Carolina, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1258, 1267 (2004) (citing GERDA LERNER, THE 
CREATION OF PATRIARCHY 116 (1986)). 
 22 Ricki Lewis Tannen, Setting the Agenda for the 1990s: The Historical 
Foundations of Gender Bias in the Law: A Context for Reconstruction, 42 FLA. L. REV. 
163, 171-72 n.53 (1990). 
 23 Id. at 172 (internal quotations omitted). 
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considered a declaration of ownership.”24 Because virginity was 
the value of a man’s property and penetration was the act that 
would devalue it, these ancient laws “undergird[ed] the notion 
that the crime of rape was complete upon penetration.”25 
For example, one court justified its holding that rape 
could not occur after penetration by reasoning that the 
“presence or absence of consent at the moment of initial 
penetration appears to be the crucial point in the crime of 
rape.”26 In further support of its holding, the court explained 
that if the victim withdrew consent and the aggressor 
continued penetration, “the sense of outrage to [her] person 
and feelings could hardly be of the same magnitude as that 
resulting from an initial nonconsensual violation of her 
womanhood.”27 By denying the possibility of postpenetration 
rape and continuing to hold that initial penetration is the 
“crucial point” at which rape can occur, courts and legislatures 
cling to the archaic notions of women as the property of their 
husbands or fathers, fetishize virginity, and justify the idea 
that a woman has nothing left to lose after the moment of 
initial penetration.28  
Second, recognizing postpenetration rape as “real rape” 
acknowledges women’s freedom to choose and their right to be 
free from unwanted invasion of their bodies.29 Rape’s chief harm 
lies “in forcibly depriving a person of her right of bodily 
integrity,” and that deprivation exists whether initial 
penetration is accomplished with or without consent.30 Indeed, 
an aggressor’s disregard of withdrawn consent “is a 
  
 24 Id. at 175. One author notes, “the . . . [ancient rape laws] all incorporated 
the principle that the injured party is the husband or father of the raped woman.” 
LERNER, supra note 21, at 116 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 25 Baby v. State, 916 A.2d 410, 426 n.6, 427 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2007) (“[I]t 
was the act of penetration that was the essence of the crime of rape; after this initial 
infringement upon the responsible male’s interest in a woman’s sexual and 
reproductive functions, any further injury was considered to be less consequential. The 
damage—viewed from the perspective of the husband’s or father’s interest in the 
reproductive functions of the victim—was done.”).  
 26 People v. Vela, 218 Cal. Rptr. 161, 164 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985). 
 27 Id. at 165. As one commentator notes, “The court did not define the term 
‘womanhood’; its opinion reveals only that ‘womanhood’ is something ‘violated’ by 
initial, unconsented penetration, and that such a violation is more harmful to a woman 
than any actions that might follow initial penetration.” Palmer, supra note 21, at 1265 
n.52 (quoting Vela, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 165). 
 28 Vela, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 164. 
 29 Estrich, supra note 18, at 1088. 
 30 Sherry F. Colb, Withdrawing Consent During Intercourse: California’s 
Highest Court Clarifies the Definition of Rape, FINDLAW’S WRIT (Jan. 15, 2003), 
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/colb/20030115.html. 
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traumatizing and humiliating experience . . . because it takes a 
decision about the most intimate, personal, and vulnerable 
matter[] in . . . life out of a woman’s hands.”31 Postpenetration 
rape, then, is as much a denial of autonomy and a violation of 
bodily integrity as rape that proceeds from a lack of initial 
consent. Criminalizing postpenetration rape acknowledges that 
consent can be freely given but subsequently taken away. If this 
were not the case, consent would operate as a transfer of 
dominion or irrevocable waiver;32 women would have no control 
over their own bodies, and men would be free to do as they 
pleased with previously “consenting” women. It seems doubtful 
that modern society would endorse a law in these terms, but the 
refusal to criminalize postpenetration rape has precisely this 
effect. In contrast, “recognizing postpenetration rape as a crime 
reflects a view of women as ‘responsible, autonomous beings who 
possess the right to personal, sexual, and bodily self-
determination,’”33 and it trusts women to make decisions regarding 
sex and their bodies. Furthermore, identifying postpenetration 
rape as a crime will help to reform attitudes about both rape and 
consensual sex, and will promote sexual egalitarianism by 
“requir[ing] men to listen to women in sexual relationships.”34 
Lastly, affirming that victims of postpenetration rape 
suffer the same harms as other rape victims helps ensure that 
they will receive equal recourse in the criminal justice system. 
Whether initial penetration is consensual or not, victims of 
forcible, nonconsensual sex suffer physical and emotional 
injuries.35 Along with the bruises, abrasions, personal 
devaluation, and fear36 that many rape victims experience, all 
rape victims experience the loss of autonomy and bodily 
integrity that result from nonconsensual penetration.  
Legal recognition and recourse would at least provide 
victims a name for their experience, though it “does not 
  
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Palmer, supra note 21, at 1275 (quoting Ronald J. Berger et al., The 
Dimensions of Rape Reform Legislation, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 329, 330 (1988)).  
 34 Id. at 1275. 
 35 Tiffany Bohn, Note, Yes, Then No, Means No: Current Issues, Trends, and 
Problems in Postpenetration Rape, 25 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 151, 169 (2004). 
Postpenetration rape victims also suffer physical and mental consequences of rape: 
anal or vaginal abrasions, emotional anguish, and Rape Trauma Syndrome (RTS). See 
State v. Bunyard, 133 P.3d 14, 19 (Kan. 2006); Katharine K. Baker, Gender and 
Emotion in Criminal Law, 28 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 447, 453 (2005); McLellan, supra 
note 7, at 796-97. 
 36 See Baker, supra note 35, at 453. 
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conform to the rape stereotype.”37 This would legitimize their 
experience as victims of crime and, when recognized as such, 
may increase reporting of these rapes.38 Moreover, such an 
acknowledgement may generate enough publicity to send the 
public a message that postpenetration rape is a real crime, 
deserving of prosecution and punishment.39  
Refusing to acknowledge continued intercourse absent 
continued consent as rape endangers women. Therefore, it is 
imperative to recognize the crime of postpenetration rape in 
order to combat the understanding of women as property, 
acknowledge women’s right to be free from unwanted bodily 
invasion, and give victims the legal recourse they deserve.  
II. DEVELOPMENT OF POSTPENETRATION RAPE LAW 
Seven states have criminalized postpenetration rape 
through the common law process.40 Of those seven states, five 
have recognized postpenetration rape since the issue was first 
presented, while two recently changed course by beginning to 
recognize postpenetration rape after years of refusing it. In 
Alaska, Connecticut, Kansas, Maine, and Minnesota, courts 
have always held that initially consensual penetration can 
become rape if penetration is forcibly continued after consent is 
withdrawn.41 In California and Maryland, courts initially 
adopted the Way reasoning42—denying that rape could occur 
postpenetration—but later overruled those cases to recognize 
postpenetration rape.43 Illinois has amended its criminal code to 
explicitly criminalize postpenetration rape, standing alone as 
the only state to have provided a legislative solution to this 
issue.44 In North Carolina, however, the unambiguous law is 
  
 37 Dana Vetterhoffer, Comment, No Means No: Weakening Sexism in Rape 
Law by Legitimizing Postpenetration Rape, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1229, 1247 (2005). 
 38 Id. at 1246-47. 
 39 See David P. Bryden, Redefining Rape, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 317, 320 
(2000); Cass Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 
2051 (1996); see also infra Section III.A. 
 40 See McGill v. State, 18 P.3d 77, 84 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001); In re John Z., 60 
P.3d 183, 185 (Cal. 2003); State v. Siering, 644 A.2d 958, 961 (Conn. App. Ct. 1994); 
State v. Bunyard, 133 P.3d 14, 27 (Kan. 2006); State v. Robinson, 496 A.2d 1067, 1070 
(Me. 1985); State v. Baby, 946 A.2d 463, 486 (Md. 2008); State v. Crims, 540 N.W.2d 
860, 865 (Min. Ct. App. 1996). 
 41 See McGill, 18 P.3d at 84; Siering, 644 A.2d at 961; Bunyard, 133 P.3d at 
27; Robinson, 496 A.2d at 1070; Crims, 540 N.W.2d at 865. 
 42 State v. Way, 254 S.E.2d 760, 761 (N.C. 1979). 
 43 In re John Z., 60 P.3d at 185; Baby, 946 A.2d at 486. 
 44 See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-1.70(c) (LexisNexis 2012).  
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that postpenetration rape is legally impossible.45 In the remaining 
forty-one states, neither the legislatures nor the courts have 
clearly articulated whether sex that is forcibly continued after 
consent is withdrawn constitutes a crime. This section will 
explore the various state approaches to postpenetration rape: 
criminalization by case law, criminalization by statute, and North 
Carolina’s refusal to criminalize. 
A. Criminalization by Case Law: The Maine Approach 
Beginning with Maine in 1985, courts in seven states have 
unequivocally held that when all the elements of rape are 
established, the time of nonconsent (whether before or after initial 
penetration) is immaterial.46 These courts have reasoned that state 
rape statutes do not preclude a holding that rape has occurred, 
even though initial penetration may have been consensual.47 
1. Maine 
In State v. Robinson, the earliest of these cases, the 
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine upheld the trial court’s ruling 
that the timing of consent is immaterial and therefore affirmed 
the defendant’s conviction.48 At trial, the prosecuting witness 
and the defendant “gave sharply divergent testimony” about 
the incident.49 She said that the intercourse was entirely 
nonconsensual. He said that the intercourse was consensual, but 
“during intercourse . . . she suddenly declared ‘I guess I don’t 
want to do this anymore,’” at which time he stopped and left.50 
During deliberations, the jury asked the judge, “if two people 
began consenting to an act, then one person says no and the other 
continues—is that rape?”51 The judge answered affirmatively and 
emphasized that the key element “is the continuation under 
compulsion.”52 The jury convicted the defendant of rape.53 
  
 45 See Way, 254 S.E.2d at 762 (“If the actual penetration is accomplished with 
the woman’s consent, the accused is not guilty of rape . . . .”). 
 46 See McGill, 18 P.3d at 84; In re John Z., 60 P.3d at 185; Siering, 644 A.2d 
at 961; Bunyard, 133 P.3d at 27; Robinson, 496 A.2d at 1070; State v. Baby, 946 A.2d 
463, 486 (Md. 2008); Crims, 540 N.W.2d at 865. 
 47 See McGill, 18 P.3d at 84; In re John Z., 60 P.3d at 185; Siering, 644 A.2d 
at 961; Bunyard, 133 P.3d at 27; Robinson, 496 A.2d at 1070; Baby, 946 A.2d at 486; 
Crims, 540 N.W.2d at 865.  
 48 Robinson, 496 A.2d at 1069. 
 49 Id. at 1068. 
 50 Id. at 1069. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. at 1070. 
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Subsequently, the trial court held that where intercourse is 
initially consensual, but then one partner reconsiders, 
“communicates the revocation . . . , and the other party continues 
the sexual intercourse by compulsion,” both the Maine Criminal 
Code and common sense permit a finding of rape.54 
On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, 
reasoning that initially consensual sex could become rape 
within the meaning of the Maine Criminal Code.55 The Code 
emphasized three elements of rape: (1) “‘sexual intercourse’ by 
the defendant,” (2) “with a person not the defendant’s spouse,” 
and (3) “in circumstances by which that other person submits 
to sexual intercourse as a result of compulsion applied by the 
defendant.”56 Chief Justice McKusick stated that “[i]n anybody’s 
everyday lexicon, the continued penetration of the female sex 
organ by the male sex organ, after the time either party has 
withdrawn consent, is factually ‘sexual intercourse,’”57 and 
where the other elements of the statute are met, this act is 
rape.58 In sum, the Supreme Judicial Court looked to the rape 
statute, the legislature’s intent, and common sense to hold that 
initially consensual penetration does prevent a conviction for 
rape if a defendant continued penetration under compulsion 
after consent was withdrawn.59 
2. Connecticut 
The Appellate Court of Connecticut followed suit in 
1994, also citing common sense as the basis for its holding.60 In 
State v. Siering, the Appellate Court held that initially 
consensual sex could become sexual assault if continued by 
force after the revocation of consent; accordingly, the court 
affirmed the defendant’s conviction of sexual assault in the 
first degree.61 As in Robinson, the trial testimony of the victim 
and the defendant were “sharply divergent.”62 The victim 
  
 53 Id. at 1068. 
 54 Id. at 1069 (stating “then it would be rape”). 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id.  
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. at 1070. The court further clarified, “We of course agree with the North 
Carolina court that a mere change of the woman’s mind in the midst of sexual 
intercourse does not turn the man’s subsequent penetration into rape.” Id. 
 59 Id. at 1069. 
 60 State v. Siering, 644 A.2d 958, 963 (Conn. App. Ct. 1994), appeal denied, 
648 A.2d 158 (Conn. 1994). 
 61 Id. at 961. 
 62 Id.  
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testified that “the defendant pulled off [her] clothes and had 
sexual intercourse with her by force” as she continued “yelling, 
screaming and fighting.”63 The defendant testified that they 
were “engaged in mutually consensual sex when the victim 
suddenly ‘snapped and yelled rape.’”64 Also like Robinson, the 
jury asked the trial judge, “if a person agrees to sexual 
intercourse then changes her mind, withdraws her consent, but 
is compelled to continue intercourse by use of force, does this 
constitute sexual assault?”65 The Appellate Court agreed with 
the trial judge’s affirmative answer that “if there exists 
consensual intercourse and the alleged victim changes her 
mind[,] communicates the revocation . . . of consent[,] and the 
other person continues the sexual intercourse by compelling 
the victim through the use of force[,] then it would be sexual 
assault in the first degree.”66  
Courts in Alaska, California, Kansas, Maryland, and 
Minnesota have cited these decisions with approval and 
explained that the law in their own states could be applied 
similarly.67 Nevertheless, California and Maryland did not show 
their approval immediately. Indeed, following Way,68 both 
states initially held that rape after consensual penetration was 
legally impossible.69 
3. California 
In 2003, the Supreme Court of California recognized the 
validity of postpenetration rape, holding that rape occurs when, 
during intercourse, one partner withdraws consent while the 
other continues the intercourse by force.70 This decision settled 
a split between two California Courts of Appeal—one agreeing 
with Way,71 the other finding postpenetration rape possible 
because the California rape statute did not specify the time for 
  
 63 Id. at 959. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. at 961 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 66 Id. (internal quotation marks and footnote omitted). 
 67 McGill v. State, 18 P.3d 77, 84 & nn.40-41 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001); In re 
John Z., 60 P.3d 183, 185 (Cal. 2003); State v. Bunyard, 133 P.3d 14, 27-28 (Kan. 2006); 
State v. Baby, 946 A.2d 463, 486 (Md. 2008); State v. Crims, 540 N.W.2d 860, 865 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1996). 
 68 See State v. Way, 254 S.E.2d 760, 762 (N.C. 1979).  
 69 See People v. Vela, 218 Cal. Rptr. 161, 164 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985); Battle v. 
State, 414 A.2d 1266, 1270 (Md. 1980). 
 70 John Z., 60 P.3d at 185. 
 71 Way, 254 S.E.2d at 762 (holding that postpenetration rape is legally 
impossible); see also Vela, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 164. 
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consent or refusal.72 The California Court of Appeal for the 
Fifth District, in People v. Vela,73 followed Way,74 emphasizing 
that the moment of penetration is the essential focus in the 
crime of rape, rather than the presence or absence of consent 
throughout the entire sex act.75 Yet Vela went further in its 
reasoning for this rule, explaining that  
the essence of the crime of rape is the outrage to the person and 
feelings of the female resulting from the nonconsensual violation of 
her womanhood. . . . If she withdraws consent . . . and the male 
forcibly continues the act without interruption, the female may 
certainly feel outrage . . . but the sense of outrage to her person and 
feelings could hardly be of the same magnitude as that resulting 
from an initial nonconsensual violation of her womanhood.76 
While the court gave no support for this proposition, its 
reasoning reflects the same archaic notions about virginity and 
women as property that formed the basis of rape definitions in 
the early English common law.77 
The California Court of Appeal for the Fourth District 
came to the opposite conclusion in People v. Roundtree,78 finding 
Vela’s conclusion “unsound.”79 Instead, the court found that 
Robinson80 articulated the appropriate standard and that, 
under the California rape statute, “a rape is necessarily 
committed if a victim is forced to continue with sexual 
intercourse against her will.”81 The California Supreme Court 
  
 72 See People v. Roundtree, 91 Cal. Rptr. 2d 921, 924 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) 
(“The crime of rape therefore is necessarily committed when a victim withdraws her 
consent during an act of sexual intercourse but is forced to complete the act. The 
statutory requirements of the offense are met as the act of sexual intercourse is forcibly 
accomplished against the victim’s will. . . . That the victim initially consented to the act 
is not determinative.”).  
 73 Vela, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 164. 
 74 Way, 254 S.E.2d at 761.  
 75 Vela, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 164; see also Way, 254 S.E.2d at 761. 
 76 Vela, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 165. 
 77 State v. Baby, 946 A.2d 463, 480 (Md. 2008) (reviewing the English 
common law regarding rape and the increased punishment for raping virgins). See 
Tannen, supra note 22, at 172. (“[A] virgin was considered a valuable asset, the value 
residing in men’s ability to gain absolute ownership of the totality of her sexual and 
reproductive functions. Any infringement upon this totality through premarital sexual 
relations rendered the asset less valuable and might even turn it into a liability.”); 
supra notes 19-28 and accompanying text. 
 78 People v. Roundtree, 91 Cal. Rptr. 2d 921, 923 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (holding 
that “[i]f all the elements of rape are present, the fact that there was a prior 
penetration with the consent of the female does not negate rape”). 
 79 Id. at 924. 
 80 State v. Robinson, 496 A.2d 1067, 1069 (Me. 1985). 
 81 Roundtree, 91 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 925. 
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soon resolved the split, approving the Roundtree82 court’s 
holding in a well-publicized and oft-cited case, In re John Z.83 
The John Z. court held that “the offense of forcible rape occurs 
when, during apparently consensual intercourse, the victim 
expresses an objection and attempts to stop the act and the 
defendant forcibly continues despite the objection.”84 The court 
reasoned that “a withdrawal of consent effectively nullifies any 
earlier consent and subjects the male to forcible rape charges if 
he persists in what has become nonconsensual intercourse.”85  
4. Maryland 
In Maryland, it was not until 2008 that the highest 
court in the state, the Court of Appeals, first recognized 
postpenetration rape.86 In State v. Baby,87 the court declined to 
follow a 1980 decision that stated that withdrawing consent 
after penetration would not constitute rape.88 Instead, the Baby 
court explicitly held that “a woman may withdraw consent for 
vaginal intercourse after penetration has occurred” and that, 
“after consent has been withdrawn, the continuation of vaginal 
intercourse by force or the threat of force may constitute 
rape.”89 At trial, the complaining witness testified that she 
submitted to penetration because she felt she did not have a 
choice.90 She stated that “he got on top of me and he tried to put 
it in and it hurt[,] . . . [s]o I said stop and that’s when he kept 
pushing it in and I was pushing his knees to get off me.”91 On 
the other hand, the defendant testified that the sex was 
consensual. As in Robinson92 and Siering,93 the jury sent two 
questions to the judge during deliberations regarding whether 
rape can occur after consensual penetration.94 The trial judge 
referred the jury to his prior instructions and the statutory 
definition of rape and consent, but he otherwise failed to 
  
 82 Id. 
 83 60 P.3d 183, 184 (Cal. 2003). 
 84 Id. at 185. 
 85 Id. at 184 (citing Roundtree, 91 Cal. Rptr. 2d 921).  
 86 State v. Baby, 946 A.2d 463, 475 (Md. 2008). 
 87 Id. 
 88 Battle v. State, 414 A.2d 1266, 1270 (Md. 1980); but see Baby, 946 A.2d at 
475 (stating that the “pronouncement in Battle was dicta”). 
 89 Baby, 946 A.2d at 486. 
 90 Id. at 467. 
 91 Id. 
 92 State v. Robinson, 496 A.2d 1067, 1069 (Me. 1985). 
 93 State v. Siering, 644 A.2d 958, 961 (Conn. App. Ct. 1994). 
 94 Baby, 946 A.2d at 471-72. 
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answer the question.95 The Court of Appeals reversed because 
the lower court’s failure to instruct the jury on postpenetration 
rape was not harmless error.96 Thus, the crime of first degree 
rape in Maryland today “includes postpenetration vaginal 
intercourse accomplished through force or threat of force and 
without the consent of the victim, even if the victim consented 
to the initial penetration.”97 
B. Criminalization by Statute: The Illinois Approach 
In Illinois, “A person who initially consents to sexual 
penetration or sexual conduct is not deemed to have consented 
to any sexual penetration or sexual conduct that occurs after he 
or she withdraws consent during the course of that sexual 
penetration or sexual conduct.”98 This explanatory amendment 
to the statute frees both the court and the jury from dwelling 
on questions of timing, while maintaining the essential 
elements of the crime of sexual assault.99 As always, the jury 
must find the elements of sexual assault, regardless of when 
consent was withdrawn (that is, pre- or postpenetration).100  
Though the amended statute marks an admirable step 
in the right direction, it is not perfect. For example, it lacks a 
clear standard for determining whether consent has been 
withdrawn, so the challenges of interpreting the statute and 
charging the jury remain obstacles. In the only reported case 
that applies Illinois’s postpenetration rape statute, People v. 
  
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. at 489. 
 97 Id. at 465. 
 98 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-1.70(c) (LexisNexis 2012).  
 99 See id. 5/11-1.20, 1.30. 
Some states now characterize the crime of rape as “sexual assault,” . . . or 
“criminal sexual conduct[.]” The reason[] for the change in nomenclature is 
that: [s]exual assault puts the concept of violence into the word rape. It 
reflects a historically recent clinical, political, and social analysis of the 
phenomenon of rape that attempts to drain off the toxins of blame-the-victim, 
and to shift the criterion of rape from the behavior of the victim to that of the 
criminal. It is an attempt to take any ambiguity out of the word rape. 
Dressler, supra note 19, at 410 n.2 (quoting RAINE, supra note 19, at 208). 
 100 See Joel Emlen, Note, A Critical Exercise in Effectuating “No Means No” 
Rape Law, 29 VT. L. REV. 215, 229 (2004) (“This law does nothing to change . . . the 
facts that need to be clarified in a court of law. . . . This does nothing whatsoever to the 
laws of Illinois . . . the presentation must be made before a judge and jury and those 
facts of the case must be determined.”) (citing Ill. SB 406, 93d Gen. Assemb., Reg. 
Sess., at 3 (Ill. 2003) (statement of Sen. Rutherford)); see also State v. Robinson, 496 
A.2d 1067, 1070 (Me. 1985) (explaining that withdrawal of consent cases still require 
proving all elements of rape).  
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Denbo, the Appellate Court of Illinois reversed the defendant’s 
conviction, finding that the victim failed to effectively 
communicate her withdrawal “in some objective manner so that 
a reasonable person in defendant’s circumstances would have 
understood that [she] no longer consented.”101 Although this 
reasonableness-under-the-circumstances standard may be 
favorable, it remains unclear whether the Illinois Supreme 
Court will approve it, how future cases will be resolved, or how 
juries will be instructed on withdrawn consent. So, although the 
Illinois statute allows for postpenetration rape convictions, it 
fails to articulate the kind of clear and unambiguous standard 
that would be desirable in postpenetration rape statutes.102 
C. A Legal Impossibility: The North Carolina Approach 
In North Carolina, “If the actual penetration is 
accomplished with the woman’s consent, the accused is not 
guilty of rape.”103 Interestingly, in Way, the Supreme Court of 
North Carolina reversed the trial court despite the jury’s vote 
to convict after the trial judge’s instruction that “consent 
initially given could be withdrawn” and that rape would occur 
“if the intercourse continued through use of force or threat of 
force . . . .”104 The Supreme Court granted a new trial, finding 
the trial judge’s instructions “erroneous”105 because consent can 
only be withdrawn between distinct acts of penetration and not 
during a single sex act.106 This means that in North Carolina, 
intercourse that is forcibly continued after withdrawal of 
consent constitutes rape only if, to borrow language from the 
Maine Supreme Court, “the prosecutrix . . . succeeds at least 
momentarily in displacing the male sex organ,” thereby 
creating a series of distinct sex acts.107 This absurd rule 
  
 101 868 N.E.2d 347, 358 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007) (internal citations omitted), appeal 
denied 875 N.E.2d 1116 (Ill. 2007). 
 102 See infra Section III.B. 
 103 State v. Way, 254 S.E.2d 760, 762 (N.C. 1979).  
 104 Id. at 761 (internal quotation marks omitted). Had this decision been 
affirmed, North Carolina would have been one of the first states to recognize 
postpenetration rape, formulating the definition in much the same terms as other 
states’ courts subsequently have. See, e.g., In re John Z., 60 P.3d 183, 185 (Cal. 2003); 
State v. Siering, 644 A.2d 958, 961 (Conn. App. Ct. 1994); Robinson, 496 A.2d at 1070; 
State v. Baby, 946 A.2d 463, 486 (Md. 2008). 
 105 Way, 254 S.E.2d at 762. 
 106 Id. at 761 (noting that “consent can be withdrawn,” but “[t]his concept 
ordinarily applies . . . to those situations in which there is evidence of more than one 
act of intercourse between the prosecutrix and the accused”). 
 107 Robinson, 496 A.2d at 1071. 
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“protect[s] from a rape prosecution the party whose compulsion 
through physical force or threat of serious bodily harm is so 
overwhelming there is no possible withdrawal, however brief.”108 
So, for now, sexual partners in North Carolina have only until 
the moment of penetration to refuse or consent to sex. 
III. THE NEED FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION 
In order to cure the absurdity that exists in North 
Carolina—that is, the fact that if a woman does not say “no” 
before penetration, it is irrelevant whether she says “no” after 
penetration—legislation is needed. Legislation is the ideal 
route to criminalizing postpenetration rape because of the 
legislature’s special ability to act prescriptively, enacting 
forward-looking laws rather than adjudicating past 
controversies.109 Lawmakers must recognize postpenetration 
rape as “real rape” by amending rape statutes to explicitly 
permit withdrawal of consent after penetration.110 The model 
statute would go beyond the Illinois statute by clarifying: (1) 
the irrelevance of the timing of when consent is withdrawn, (2) 
the continued validity of the other statutory elements of rape, 
(3) the equivalence of postpenetration rape to other rape 
crimes, and (4) the standard for assessing withdrawn consent. 
This part first addresses the importance of criminalizing 
postpenetration rape by statute and then recommends the form 
and substance of such a statute.  
A. The Importance of a Statute 
There is an expressive function to law, which is largely 
visible through its impact on society’s current norms.111 Indeed, 
empirical evidence suggests that the increases in rape 
reporting and convictions that follow rape law reforms are 
mainly a consequence of “evolving public attitudes . . . rather 
than specific legal changes, except insofar as national publicity 
accompanying the changes may have affected attitudes 
everywhere.”112 Regardless of the specific reason for the rise in 
reporting and convictions, clearly worded statutes will 
  
 108 Id. 
 109 See Bohn, supra note 35, at 164. 
 110 See Estrich, supra note 18, at 1088. 
 111 See Sunstein, supra note 39, at 2051. 
 112 Bryden, supra note 39, at 320 (footnote omitted). 
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hopefully encourage the trend.113 Likewise, effective statutes 
could eliminate the need to wait for perfect facts, a credible 
complaining witness, a creative prosecutor, and an open-
minded judge and jury.114 Finally, statutory amendments would 
set clear guidelines for juries and avoid the confusion that 
arises in rape trials from facts that indicate the presence of 
initial consent to penetration.115  
As an initial matter, statutory law can both reflect and 
alter public perceptions and ideas,116 and in doing so, can lead to 
increased reporting of postpenetration rape. 
Traditionally, the law has done more than reflect the restrictive and 
sexist views of our society; it has legitimized and contributed to 
them. . . . [A] law that rejected those views and respected female 
autonomy might do more than reflect the changes in our society; it 
might even push them forward a bit.117  
Statutes that explicitly criminalize postpenetration rape could 
convince people that it is “real rape” and should be recognized 
as such.118 This would likely lead to increased reporting because 
“women are far more likely to report rapes . . . [that are] 
perceived to be real rapes.”119 Moreover, a statute criminalizing 
postpenetration rape might boost reporting by generating 
publicity and fostering greater awareness of postpenetration 
rape. For example, a 1992 study of the effect of rape law 
reforms in six U.S. cities concluded that the rise in rape 
reporting following reform efforts probably “resulted from 
publicity surrounding the reforms.”120 Indeed, the passage of the 
  
 113 Vetterhoffer, supra note 37, at 1243-59; see also David Bryden & Sonja 
Lengnick, Rape in the Criminal Justice System, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1194, 
1286 (1997).  
 114 See Davis, supra note 8, at 763 (explaining that one reason for passing the 
Illinois statue was to avoid a lengthy court battle). 
 115 See infra text accompanying notes 132-36. 
 116 See Estrich, supra note 18, at 1093-94; see also Sunstein, supra note 39, at 
2051 (on the expressive function of the law). 
 117 Estrich, supra note 18, at 1093-94. 
 118 See id. 
 119 Bennett Capers, The Unintentional Rapist, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 1345, 1388 
n.263 (2010). “Because the credibility of rape victims is often put in question, rape victims 
are more likely to report rapes where their credibility will be least doubted. In these 
circumstances, women report rapes that society will accept as real rapes, i.e. rapes 
involving strangers or black men.” Id. Postpenetration rape, like other rapes that do not 
“fit the paradigm of the stranger in the bushes,” is less likely to be perceived as “real 
rape.” Mary I. Coombs, Telling the Victim’s Story, 2 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 277, 293 (1993). 
 120 Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 113, at 1227 (citing CASSIA SPOHN & JULIE 
HORNEY, RAPE LAW REFORM: A GRASSROOTS REVOLUTION AND ITS IMPACT 18 (1992)). 
2013] CRIMINALIZING POSTPENETRATION RAPE 1083 
 
Illinois statute was reported in national papers.121 Therefore, 
the passage of clear and explicit postpenetration rape 
statutes—and the publicity that entails—will broadcast to the 
public that postpenetration rape is “real rape,” which may 
encourage increased reporting.  
A clear statute could also increase prosecution rates. 
Although prosecutors are generally “reluctant to prosecute 
cases in which the odds are long against a conviction,” a statute 
could increase the odds of conviction and thus the odds of 
prosecution in postpenetration rape cases.122 Perhaps this is 
especially true in North Carolina, where case law has 
foreclosed the possibility of postpenetration rape; there, 
prosecutors might not pursue cases that look like 
postpenetration rape because of the low odds of success. The 
dismissal of charges against Osvaldo Sombo123 provides just one 
example of the types of cases that will never go to trial because 
of Way’s holding.124 If it is possible that both partners have 
consented before penetration, the continued validity of Way125 
could render prosecution futile.126 Furthermore, prosecutors 
may be similarly reluctant to prosecute what appears to be 
initially consensual sex in states where courts have never 
considered the question of postpenetration rape.127 In these 
states, statutory recognition of postpenetration rape could 
facilitate the prosecution of claims like the one against 
Osvaldo, instead of leaving his victim—and victims in the 
majority of states—without legal recourse.128  
In addition to encouraging reporting and prosecution, a 
statute would ensure immediate reform, eliminating the need 
to wait for state courts to take the lead in recognizing 
postpenetration rape as a crime.129 In fact, the Illinois 
  
 121 The signing of the Illinois statutory amendment which criminalized 
postpenetration rape was covered by the N.Y. Times, Jo Napolitano, National Briefing 
Midwest: Illinois: Exactly When No Means No, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2003, at A14, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/08/01/us/national-briefing-midwest-illinois-
exactly-when-no-means-no.html, and the Chicago Tribune, Christi Parsons, “No” 
Really Means “No” in Sex Law Clarification, CHI. TRIB., July 29, 2003, at 1, available at 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2003-07-29/news/0307290136_1_sexual-assault-
sexual-activity-law. 
 122 Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 113, at 1379. 
 123 Dismissal, supra note 2, at 2; see also supra notes 2-6 and accompanying text. 
 124 254 S.E.2d 760, 761 (N.C. 1979). 
 125 Id. 
 126 See, e.g., Dismissal, supra note 2, at 2. 
 127 See Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 113, at 1379. 
 128 See id. at 1225-29; Vetterhoffer, supra note 37, at 1246. 
 129 See Davis, supra note 8, at 762-63. 
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postpenetration statute was added to the criminal code 
specifically in response to a lengthy court battle over 
postpenetration rape in California.130 In light of the similarity 
between California and Illinois’s rape statutes, the bill’s 
sponsors sought to “avoid lengthy litigation in the Illinois 
courts” by clearly identifying postpenetration rape as rape.131 If 
legislatures in other states prospectively passed 
postpenetration rape statutes, lengthy and uncertain litigation 
like In re John Z. could be avoided. 
Finally, a postpenetration rape statute would help to 
eliminate confusion among judges and jurors in cases where 
the facts indicate that sex may have been initially consensual. 
Often, trial courts are deferential to the statute when 
instructing the jury132 and answering jurors’ questions about 
the possibility of postpenetration rape.133 For example, after 
beginning deliberations in State v. Bunyard, the jury asked the 
trial judge, “If someone allows penetration, but then says no 
and [the defendant] does not stop, does that fit the legal 
definition of rape?”134 The judge pointed to the instructions and 
responded, “I cannot elaborate any further. Please reread the 
instructions.”135 Likewise, the trial judge in Robinson answered 
a similar question by referring to the statute and “repeat[ing] 
his careful description of what constitutes the compulsion 
necessary for a conviction for rape under the [Maine] Criminal 
Code.”136 Postpenetration rape statutes could eliminate this 
confusion among jurors and provide judges with clear guidance.  
  
 130 Bohn, supra note 35, at 165; see also In re John Z., 60 P.3d 183, 184 (Cal. 
2003) (holding that “a withdrawal of consent effectively nullifies any earlier consent 
and subjects the male to forcible rape charges if he persists in what has become 
nonconsensual intercourse”); People v. Roundtree, 91 Cal. Rptr. 2d 921, 923 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2000) (holding that “[i]f all of the elements of rape are present, the fact that there 
was a prior penetration with the consent of the female does not negate rape”); People v. 
Vela, 218 Cal. Rptr. 161, 164 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that consent withdrawn 
after penetration is irrelevant because “the presence or absence of consent at the 
moment of initial penetration appears to be the crucial point in the crime of rape”). 
 131 Bohn, supra note 35, at 165; see also Vetterhoffer, supra note 37, at 1243 (2005). 
 132 See infra Part IV (discussing jury instructions in detail). 
 133 Bohn, supra note 35, at 162. 
 134 State v. Bunyard, 133 P.3d 14, 26 (Kan. 2006) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 135 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (jury instructions contained the 
statutory elements of rape under Kansas law). 
 136 State v. Robinson, 496 A.2d 1067, 1069 (Me. 1985). 
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B. Recommended Form and Substance 
In order to accomplish these goals, postpenetration rape 
statutes should clarify four separate elements: the irrelevance of 
the timing of withdrawn consent, the continued validity of the 
other statutory elements of rape, the equivalence of 
postpenetration rape to other rape crimes, and the standard for 
assessing withdrawn consent. This section will examine the 
elements of the Illinois postpenetration rape statute as well a 
bill pending in the North Carolina General Assembly, and it will 
then propose a model statute that borrows elements from each. 
The Illinois postpenetration rape statute contains the 
first three elements recommended for an effective statute 
above, but it fails to provide the fourth element: a clear 
standard for assessing withdrawn consent. Under the first 
element, the statutory language unequivocally makes timing of 
withdrawn consent irrelevant by providing that “[a] person who 
initially consents . . . is not deemed to have consented to any 
sexual penetration . . . that occurs after he or she withdraws 
consent.”137 Under the second element, the statute does not 
change the elements of the crime of sexual assault;138 instead, it 
merely clarifies that timing is irrelevant, while all other 
elements of rape must still be proved.139 In fact, advocates for 
the Illinois statute stressed that the statute does not “change 
the legal standard in Illinois, but rather spells out exactly what 
lawmakers have intended all along.”140 Under the third element, 
the Illinois statute does not add postpenetration rape as a 
separate or lesser offense. On the contrary, the Illinois statute 
resides in a section entitled, “Defenses with Respect to Offenses 
Described in Sections 11-1.20 through 11-1.60.”141 Thus, the 
statute clarifies that postpenetration rape is rape, not a 
separate or less serious crime. The Illinois statute’s real 
drawback is that it lacks a clear standard for when consent is 
effectively withdrawn, the fourth recommended element.142 
Indeed, no standard at all is provided in text of the statute. 
In addition to the Illinois statute, the North Carolina 
General Assembly introduced a bill in 2011 that would, if 
  
 137 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-1.70(c) (LexisNexis 2012); see also supra 
notes 98-100 and accompanying text. 
 138 See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-1.20, 1.30. 
 139 Parsons, supra note 121. 
 140 Id. 
 141 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-1.70.  
 142 See supra text accompanying notes 98-102.  
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passed, criminalize postpenetration rape and invalidate Way.143 
The North Carolina bill (HB 849) also includes three of the four 
elements listed above, failing instead on the third element. HB 
849 would accomplish the first goal by making timing 
irrelevant. Indeed, the language is very clear: “A person who 
initially consents . . . is not deemed to have consented to any 
penetration that occurs after the person withdraws consent.”144 
The bill also accomplishes the second goal by leaving the 
elements of other types of rape unchanged.145 In addition, HB 
849 meets the fourth goal by including a helpful standard for 
when consent has been withdrawn. The bill states that “[t]he 
withdrawal of consent must be clearly communicated in a way 
that a reasonable person would understand to constitute 
withdrawal of consent.”146 
Unfortunately, the bill fails the third goal: it does not 
treat postpenetration rape symmetrically with other rape.147 
The bill would make postpenetration rape only a Class E 
felony, whereas first and second degree rape in North Carolina 
are Class B1 and Class C felonies, respectively.148 Depending on 
prior felony convictions and aggravating or mitigating factors, 
the North Carolina structured sentencing chart prescribes a 
penalty of 12 years to life without parole for a Class B1 
felony.149 For a Class C felony, the sentence could be 44 to 182 
months.150 In contrast, the sentence range for a Class E felony is 
just 15 to 63 months.151 Accordingly, although HB 849 
recognizes postpenetration rape as a crime, its categorization of 
postpenetration rape as a less serious offense, deserving less 
punishment, only partially solves the problems of refusing to 
recognize postpenetration rape as “real rape.”152 
A model statute might help to resolve the deficiencies of 
each approach. Such a statute, a hybrid of the Illinois statute 
  
 143 See H.B. 849, 2011 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2011). 
 144 Id. (adding N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.3A(b)). 
 145 See generally id.  
 146 Id. (emphasis added). 
 147 Id. 
 148 Id. (adding N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.3A(c)); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 14-27.2; 14-27.3 (West 2010).  
 149 N.C. SENTENCING AND POLICY ADVISORY COMM’N, STRUCTURED SENTENCING 
TRAINING AND REFERENCE MANUAL 4 (2009), available at http://www.nccourts.org/ 
Courts/CRS/Councils/spac/Documents/sstrainingmanual_09.pdf. 
 150 Id. 
 151 Id. 
 152 See supra Part I. 
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and the standard for withdrawn consent from the North 
Carolina bill, could be written as follows: 
A person who initially consents to sexual penetration or sexual 
conduct is not deemed to have consented to any sexual penetration 
or sexual conduct that occurs after he or she withdraws consent 
during the course of that sexual penetration or sexual conduct.153 The 
withdrawal of consent must be clearly communicated in a way that a 
reasonable person [under the circumstances] would understand to 
constitute withdrawal of consent.154 
This model statute combines the best elements of the Illinois 
statute and HB 849. From the Illinois statute, it borrows the 
first three elements: that the timing of withdrawn consent is 
irrelevant, that all statutory elements of rape are unchanged, 
and that postpenetration rape is not a lesser or different crime 
from other rape. From HB 849, this model statute borrows HB 
849’s strongest point: the clear standard for assessing 
withdrawn consent. Thus, the model postpenetration statute 
would include all four recommended elements, sending a 
message that postpenetration rape is “real rape” and punishing 
its commission accordingly.  
IV. JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN POSTPENETRATION RAPE TRIALS 
Of course, an effective statute is only the beginning. 
There must also be clear, concise jury instructions for 
postpenetration rape. These instructions are especially 
important in postpenetration rape prosecutions because this 
form of rape may not fall within the public’s contemplation of 
rape. Such instruction would therefore combat juror confusion 
when jurors are faced with facts that indicate initially 
consensual penetration. Indeed, in the majority of the cases 
examined in Part II, the jury, rather than the judge or the 
parties, inquired about the significance of consent withdrawn 
after penetration and whether this could constitute rape.155 
  
 153 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-1.70(c) (LexisNexis 2012). 
 154 H.B. 849, adding N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.3A(b), 2011 Gen. Assemb., Reg. 
Sess. (N.C. 2011). 
 155 In McGill v. State, for example, after being charged the jury returned a 
question to the judge, asking, “if one or another of the parties involved says ‘stop,’ does 
consent for sex terminate at this point?” 18 P.3d 77, 82 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001). In State 
v. Baby, the jury sent two questions to the judge. The first asked, “If a female consents 
to sex initially and, during the course of the sex act to which she consented, for 
whatever reason, she changes her mind and the man continues until climax, does the 
result constitute rape?” 946 A.2d 463, 471 (Md. 2008) The second question asked, “If at 
any time the woman says stop is that rape?” Id. at 471. The judge answered, “This is a 
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Instead of waiting for a jury to ask, jurors should be instructed, 
in sex-neutral phrasing, on the possibility of postpenetration 
rape, its elements, the standard to be applied, and the 
circumstances to take into account.  
The persistence of sex-specific language, in both rape 
statutes and jury instructions, reinforces the idea that only 
women are raped and only men are rapists.156 However, men 
can be victims of rape, and women can be rapists.157 Utilizing 
sex-neutral language will begin the process of recognizing that 
not all rape is perpetrated on women by men.  
Moreover, the standard for culpability must be one of 
reasonableness under the circumstances; the victim’s 
withdrawal of consent, whether by words or actions, must be 
capable of being understood by a reasonable person in the 
defendant’s circumstances. This standard requires one party to 
manifest withdrawal of consent in a manner capable of being 
understood by a reasonable person, and it requires the other 
party to understand and react to that withdrawal as a 
reasonable person. This standard anticipates the gender bias 
that “objective” or “subjective” language are likely to provoke. 
Objective standards in general have been criticized by feminist legal 
theorists who have argued that these standards inherently embody 
male values. Our understanding of what is “objective” has been 
based largely on male experience, and stereotypes of men as 
objective and analytical have been contrasted with stereotypes of 
women as subjective and emotional.158  
On the other hand, a concern with “the subjective standard in 
postpenetration rape prosecution is that it may require juries 
to perceive the withdrawal of consent from a masculine 
perspective.”159 Women are statistically more likely to be victims 
of rape and sexual assault, so a man would usually be in the 
  
question that you as a jury must decide. I have given the legal definition of rape which 
includes the definition of consent.” Id. at 471-72. And in State v. Robinson, the jury sent 
the judge a question that asked, “if two people began consenting to an act, then one 
person says no and the other continues—is that rape?” 496 A.2d 1067, 1069 (Me. 1985). 
 156 “[E]ven though most rape statutes have been amended so that their 
language is gender neutral, our prosecutions continue to be over-determined by 
gender.” Capers, supra note 11, at 1299.  
 157 See generally Capers, supra note 11 (calling attention to the existence of 
male rape victimization). The particular sex of the victim and the defendant can be 
taken into account by considering “all the circumstances” of the particular crime, 
without casting women in the perpetual role of victim.  
 158 ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST LAWMAKING 
139 (2000). 
 159 Emlen, supra note 100, at 234-35. 
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position of interpreting words or conduct intended to withdraw 
consent.160 An objective standard may therefore “diminish the 
possibility that juries will interpret the victim’s actions only 
from a masculine standard of communication.”161  
In reality, however, “subjective and objective are poles 
on a continuum, because under either approach the jury must 
find that the actor acted reasonably.”162 Therefore, rather than 
characterizing the standard as “objective” or “subjective,” the 
jury should be instructed to determine whether the defendant 
understood the complainant’s manifestation as a withdrawal of 
consent (through words or conduct) or whether a reasonable 
person in the defendant’s situation would have understood the 
manifestation as a withdrawal of consent for penetration. One 
example of such an instruction is the paragraph that was 
added to the California Jury Instructions163 after In re John Z.164 
The California instructions defining consent in rape 
prosecutions now explain:  
A person who initially consents and participates in the act . . . has 
the right to withdraw that consent. To be effective as a withdrawal 
of consent, the person must inform the other person by words or 
conduct that consent no longer exists, and the other person must 
stop. The words or conduct must be sufficient to cause a reasonable 
person to be aware that consent has been withdrawn. If the other 
person knows or reasonably should know that consent has been 
withdrawn[,] . . . continuing the act . . . despite the objection, is 
against the will and without the consent of the person.165 
Thus, both parties are responsible for unambiguous, two-way 
communication, and both are required to act reasonably.  
Lastly, jury instructions must take into account the 
circumstances of the particular case. The relevant 
circumstances, among others, may include the events preceding 
intercourse, the mental states of the parties at the time of 
intercourse, the sexes of the parties, the relative sizes or 
strengths of the parties, and the methods of communication 
normally used by the parties. Taking into account all relevant 
facts ensures some measure of individualization and specificity 
  
 160 Id. 
 161 Id. 
 162 SCHNEIDER, supra note 158, at 139. 
 163 COMM. ON STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CRIMINAL, CALIF. JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS, CRIMINAL § 1.23.1 (2004). 
 164 60 P.3d 183 (Cal. 2003). 
 165 COMM. ON STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CRIMINAL, CALIF. JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS, CRIMINAL § 1.23.1 (2004). 
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in assessing the manner of withdrawn consent. Considering all 
relevant circumstances also points jurors toward the particular 
facts of the case and away from conscious or unconscious 
stereotypes and myths about rape.  
An instruction that accomplishes all of this may look 
very similar to California’s instruction on consent,166 but it 
would differ by explicitly requiring consideration of the 
circumstances. For example, a model jury instruction might be 
written as follows: 
The words or conduct must be sufficient to cause a reasonable person 
[in the defendant’s circumstances] to be aware that consent has been 
withdrawn. If the other person knows or reasonably should know 
[under the circumstances] that consent has been withdrawn, forcibly 
continuing the act of despite the objection[] is against the will and 
without the consent of the person.167 
An instruction of this kind would allow jurors to account for the 
particular facts of the case, without either sex-specific language 
or vague terms like “objective” or “subjective.” 
Explicit, uniform, and sex-neutral instructions charging 
jurors with applying a reasonableness standard and taking into 
account all the circumstances will enable jurors to properly 
understand and assess the crime of postpenetration rape. As a 
result, the conviction rate in postpenetration rape prosecutions 
should increase, and victims may begin to believe that their 
cases will be taken seriously and assessed fairly. This could 
contribute to higher reporting rates and lower attrition rates in 
rape prosecutions, and ultimately, it could reduce the incidence 
of postpenetration rape. 
V. REASONABLE TIME ALLOWANCE 
A postpenetration rape statute or pattern jury 
instruction should not include an allowance for a “reasonable 
time,” like that created by the Supreme Court of Kansas in 
Bunyard.168 There, the court explained, “In the case of 
consensual intercourse and withdrawn consent, . . . the 
defendant should be entitled to a reasonable time in which to 
act after consent is withdrawn and communicated to the 
defendant . . . .”169 Dissenting judges, in both Bunyard and a 
  
 166 Id. 
 167 Id. 
 168 133 P.3d 14, 30 (Kan. 2006).  
 169 Id.  
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more recent case, State v. Flynn, sharply disagreed.170 In 
Bunyard, Judge Luckert dissented in part, stating that the 
majority had taken it upon themselves to create a “reasonable 
time” defense for Bunyard and future defendants.171 In Flynn, 
Judge Malone dissented, stating that “the Kansas Supreme 
Court should reevaluate its holding in Bunyard on this point.”172 
He declared that the reasonable time instruction “went beyond 
the statutory language,” reiterating Judge Luckert’s concern 
that “Kansas appellate courts should not add a judicially 
created defense allowing a reasonable time in which to commit 
rape.”173  
In contrast to the approach of the Kansas courts, 
neither the Illinois statute174 nor the North Carolina House 
Bill175 includes a “reasonable time” allowance. Likewise, the 
Supreme Court of California rejected a “reasonable time” 
allowance in In re John Z.176 Nevertheless, the court in In re 
John Z. did not go far enough; it should have explicitly held 
that there is no “reasonable time” in which to continue sex 
after one partner has withdrawn consent.177 In the case of 
consent withdrawn during sexual penetration, communicated 
by words or acts capable of being understood by a reasonable 
person under the circumstances, the only “reasonable time” to 
respond is immediately. Explicit approval of continued 
penetration for any amount of time under these circumstances 
  
 170 Id. at 35 (Luckert, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part); State v. 
Flynn, 257 P.3d 1259, 1265 (Kan. Ct. App. 2011) (Malone, J., dissenting). 
 171 Bunyard, 133 P.3d at 35 (Luckert, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). 
 172 Flynn, 257 P.3d at 1265 (Malone, J., dissenting). Petition for review was 
granted on January 20, 2012, see Kansas Judicial Branch, Petitions for Review—
Calendar Year 2012: History of Previous Actions, KAN. SUP. CT., http://www.kscourts.org/ 
Cases-and-Opinions/Petitions-for-Review/Previous-Actions-2012.asp (Case # 103,566) 
(last visited June 4, 2013), and as of June 9, 2013, briefs have been submitted and 
hearing scheduled for September 11, 2013. See Case Search Result, KAN. APPELLATE CTS., 
http://intranet.kscourts.org:7780/pls/ar/CLERKS_OFFICE.list_case_detail?i_case_ 
number=103566&i_case_name= (last visited June 9, 2013).  
 173 Id. at 1264-65 (Malone, J., dissenting); see also Bunyard, 133 P.3d at 35 
(Luckert, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). 
 174 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-1.70(c) (LexisNexis 2012).  
 175 H.B. 849, 2011 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2011). 
 176 In re John Z., 60 P.3d 183, 187-88 (Cal. 2003) (noting a “lack of supporting 
authority for defendant’s ‘primal urge’ theory” and that “[n]othing in the language of 
section 261 [the California rape statute] or the case law suggests that the defendant is 
entitled to persist in intercourse once his victim withdraws her consent”). 
 177 See Henry F. Fradella & Kegan Brown, Withdrawal of Consent 
Postpenetration: Redefining the Law of Rape, 41 CRIM. L. BULL. 3, 19 (2005). The In re John 
Z. dissent also takes issue with the lack of guidance provided to juries and lower courts. 
Specifically that the majority does not specify “how soon would have been soon enough. Ten 
seconds? Thirty? A minute?” In re John Z., 60 P.3d at 190 (Brown, J., dissenting). 
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creates a safe harbor for rape, perpetuates deleterious 
stereotypes, and denies autonomy to sex partners.  
A. “Safe Harbor” Problem 
First, the “reasonable time” allowance will make 
conviction difficult because it creates a “safe harbor” of an 
unknown duration for rapists to persist in their crime.178 The 
dissent in In re John Z. rightly criticizes the majority for 
leaving judges, defendants, and the people wondering how long 
would be an acceptably “reasonable time” to persist.179 All we 
know from the In re John Z. majority is that four to five 
minutes would have been unreasonable, even if the court had 
accepted the defendant’s “reasonable time” argument.180 Other 
courts have failed to offer better guidance on “reasonable 
time.”181 Thus, not only is a “safe harbor” created for continued 
penetration, but there is no indication of how long this “safe 
harbor” lasts. Rather, it shouldn’t exist at all, and neither state 
courts nor state legislatures should create or allow a defense 
that says “just a little nonconsensual sex is okay.”  
B. Perpetuating Stereotypes 
Second, allowing for a “reasonable time” to discontinue 
penetration after consent is withdrawn will mean legislative or 
judicial approval of stereotypes about the “unstoppable male”182 
and his “primal urge.”183 For example, the defendant in In re 
John Z. argued for a “reasonable time” allowance because “[b]y 
essence of the act of sexual intercourse, a male’s primal urge to 
reproduce is aroused . . . [and it is] therefore unreasonable for a 
female and the law to expect a male to cease having sexual 
intercourse immediately upon her withdrawal of consent.”184 
  
 178 Bunyard, 133 P.3d at 35 (Luckert, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). 
 179 In re John Z., 60 P.3d at 190 (Brown, J., dissenting). 
 180 Id. at 187 (stating that “even were we to accept defendant’s ‘reasonable time’ 
argument, in the present case he clearly was given ample time to withdraw [at least four to 
five minutes] but refused to do so despite Laura’s resistance and objections”). 
 181 Bunyard, 133 P.3d at 31 (holding that even where the defendant persisted 
for five to ten minutes after consent was withdrawn, the determination of 
discontinuing within a “reasonable time” must be left to the jury); State v. Flynn, 257 
P.3d 1259, 1263-64 (Kan. Ct. App. 2011) (holding that persisting in intercourse for 
thirty seconds to two minutes after consent was withdrawn was sufficient to warrant a 
jury instruction on “reasonable time”). 
 182 Palmer, supra note 21, at 1276. 
 183 In re John Z., 60 P.3d at 187. 
 184 Id. 
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John Z. wanted the court to find that his continued penetration 
for four or five minutes after consent was withdrawn was not 
rape because “[i]t is only natural, fair and just that a male be 
given a reasonable amount of time in which to quell his primal 
urge . . . .”185 This is an “absurdity” without legal or factual 
basis,186 which, if believed, puts the responsibility on women to 
“avoid awakening the man’s primal urge.”187  
There is no legal basis for such an allowance. Living 
within society requires control of one’s “primal desires.”188 
Indeed, criminal statutes are not written with exceptions for 
those unable to exert self-control.189 To that end, 
postpenetration rape statutes and case law should not 
acknowledge or accommodate the existence of a “primal urge.”190 
Moreover, the “primal urge”191 appears factually unfounded. The 
“absurdity” of the need for a “reasonable time” to desist is well 
illustrated by the stark example of an eighteen-year-old-male, 
who engages in sexual intercourse with a partner when his 
parents surprise them in the act.192 “Surely, neither [the boy] 
nor his parents would think . . . that he needs a reasonable 
period of time to finish.”193  
Most dangerous, though, is that treating these 
unfounded stereotypes as fact places the fault of 
postpenetration rape on the woman who “aroused” a man’s 
“primal urge.”194 If courts and legislatures recognize that men 
are subject to this “primal urge” as a matter of fact,195 then the 
responsibility will shift to the victim “to prove that she took all 
possible steps to avoid awakening the man’s primal urge.”196 
This would require women to restrict their behavior to avoid 
being assaulted and take the blame if they are assaulted.197  
  
 185 Id. 
 186 Fradella & Brown, supra note 177, at 18. 
 187 Colb, supra note 30.  
 188 Fradella & Brown, supra note 177, at 19. 
 189 See id. 
 190 In re John Z., 60 P.3d 183, 187 (Cal. 2003).  
 191 Id.  
 192 Fradella & Brown, supra note 177, at 19. 
 193 Id. 
 194 In re John Z., 60 P.3d at 187. 
 195 Id. 
 196 Colb, supra note 30. 
 197 Id. 
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C. Violation of Autonomy and Bodily Integrity 
Lastly, the reasonable time defense represents a 
violation of autonomy and bodily integrity that should be 
eliminated when recognizing postpenetration rape as a crime. 
Granting a “reasonable time” to persist in penetration after 
consent has been withdrawn sanctions ignorance and disregard 
for a partner’s verbal or nonverbal manifestations of 
nonconsent. In an ideal, egalitarian, and consensual sexual 
relationship, each partner would freely give or withdraw his or 
her consent, and partners would comply immediately.198 The 
“reasonable time” allowance is incompatible with this ideal. 
Once postpenetration rape is recognized as a criminal harm, 
equivalent to other sexual assaults, that recognition of 
autonomy and bodily integrity should not be limited by a 
“reasonable time” allowance.  
A likely counterargument is that the “reasonable time” 
defense acknowledges the reality that humans are not capable 
of reacting to verbal commands instantaneously—that is, that 
all actions require some time for processing and reacting. But 
clear jury instructions obviate this concern. Instructions 
requiring a manifestation of withdrawn consent, capable of 
being understood by a reasonable person, ensure that the 
defendant reasonably should have understood the withdrawal 
of consent and discontinued penetration immediately. In other 
words, by the time the withdrawal could have been understood 
by a reasonable person in the defendant’s circumstances, the 
response should be immediate. Additionally, any ambiguity in 
communication should be resolved in favor of ceasing sexual 
activity immediately, not prolonging it until the defendant can 
discern the withdrawal with absolute certainty.199 Therefore, 
there should be no “reasonable time” allowance. Whether 
judicially or legislatively appended, it condones “just a little” 
rape, perpetuates dangerous stereotypes, and denies autonomy 
to sex partners.  
  
 198 The broader issue here, though beyond the scope of this note, is the much-needed 
shift to an affirmative-permission standard rather than an absence-of-objection standard for 
consent. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 35, at 452 & nn.25, 34 (discussing an affirmative consent 
standard and recognition of preference as protecting and respecting autonomy). 
 199 See Baker, supra note 35, at 451-53. 
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CONCLUSION 
Between law and society there exists a dialectic, whereby 
each informs the other.200 A change in social consciousness can 
lead to legal reform, just as changes in the law color public 
perception, morality, and ideals.201 It is because of this dialectic 
that statutes criminalizing postpenetration rape are desperately 
needed, both to acknowledge that it is “real rape” and provide 
clear standards for prosecution and conviction. In addition, in 
order to communicate between the law and the people, jury 
instructions must explain, in unambiguous terms, how 
postpenetration rape statutes should be applied.  
The ultimate impact of these reforms and the interface 
between law and society could be incredibly positive and far-
reaching. Hopefully, three main impacts will result: (1) the 
number of rapes and sexual assaults committed will decrease 
by virtue of disseminating knowledge and raising 
consciousness; (2) the reporting rate of these rapes and 
assaults will increase as more nonconsensual sex acts are 
recognized as legitimate crimes deserving criminal prosecution 
and punishment; and (3) the rates of prosecution and 
conviction in postpenetration cases will increase as reporting 
rates and public attitudes about the legitimacy of these crimes 
improve. Rather than a paradigm shift that begins with a 
change in public sentiment and proceeds with a piecemeal 
transformation of the law, in the case of rape and sexual 
assault, a change that begins with the law and radiates 
outward seems the most clear, direct, and influential method 
for ending sexual violence. 
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